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Abstract—In this paper, we present an achievable security
scheme for an interference channel with arbitrary number of
users. In this model, each receiver should be able to decode
its intended message while it cannot decode any meaningful
information regarding messages intended for other receivers.
Our scheme achieves individual secure rates which scale linearly
with log(SNR) and achieves sum secure rates which is within
constant gap of sum secure capacity. To design the encoders at
the transmitters side, we combine nested lattice coding, random
i.i.d. codes, and cooperative jamming techniques. Asymmetric
compute-and-forward framework is used to perform the decoding
operation at the receivers. The novelty of our scheme is that it
is the first asymptotically optimal achievable scheme for this
security scenario which scales to arbitrary number of users and
works for any finite-valued SNR. Also, our scheme achieves the
upper bound sum secure degrees of freedom of 1 without using
external helpers.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless communication channels are susceptible to leakage
and interception by illegitimate users. Oftentimes, crypto-
graphic algorithms such as the public key systems (PKI)
are used to provide confidentiality. Many of such techniques
rely on trapdoor functions whose security are threatened by
advances in quantum computers and artificial intelligence.
On the other hand, information theoretic tools such as i.i.d.
random codes in [1], [2], promise unconditional security.
These techniques have been vastly studied in different commu-
nication models including interference channels [3]. In the last
decade, studies showed that despite promising performance of
random codes in achieving reliable transmission, these codes
perform poorly in achieving high secure rates in high SNR
regime. In [4], [5] it was shown that the i.i.d. Gaussian random
codes achieve zero sum secure degrees of freedom as SNR
approaches infinity. To combat this limitation, structured codes
have been incorporated in several security scenarios in which
they outperformed Gaussian random codes [4], [6], [7]. In [8],
Babaheidarian et al., presented an achievable scheme using
structured lattice codes which was shown to provide weak
secrecy, defined in [9], in a two-user interference channel
with weak or moderately weak interference power levels. The
advantage of their scheme compared to prior research based on
real alignment [4] is that the scheme in [8] maintains security
at any finite SNR value and the secure rates linearly scale
with log(SNR). Furthermore, they showed their scheme is
asymptotically optimal. However, the scheme in [8] assumed
only a two-user scenario and the direct generalization to
arbitrary number of users is not straightforward.
In this work, we present a new achievable secure scheme
for an interference channel with arbitrary number of users
specifically (K > 2) users in which interference level is
within weak or moderately weak regimes. Inspired by [8], [10],
[11], our scheme utilizes the compute-and-forward decoding
framework to handle finite SNR regimes as opposed to real-
alignment schemes in [5], [7] which applied a maximum
likelihood decoder. Our scheme takes advantage of a two-
layer codebook structure in which the inner layer uses a set of
nested lattice codebooks and the outer layer uses i.i.d. repeated
codes. The novelty of our scheme is that the proposed scheme
scales to any number of users (K > 2) and works at any
finite SNR value. Also, we show that our scheme achieves
optimal sum secure degrees of freedom of 1 asymptotically.
Thus, our achievable sum secure rate is within constant gap
from sum secure capacity in finite SNR regime. It is worth
to mention that unlike prior schemes in [4] and [12], in
our scheme, transmitters collectively ensure confidentiality of
their messages at every unintended receiver without using any
external helper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
defines the problem statement and our assumptions, Section III
introduces our achievablity results, Section IV provides proof
of achievablity and finally conclusion remarks are presented
in Section V.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this paper, we focus on the problem of simultaneous
transmission of secure messages to their intended receivers in
a K- user interference channel where K is an arbitrary even
number and K > 2. For the case with odd number of users,
one dummy user is added. At receiver i (1 ≤ i ≤ K), the
channel output is denoted as yi and at transmitter j the input
to the channel is denoted as Xj . The channel gain between
transmitter j and receiver i is denoted as hji, and lastly, the
noise at receiver i is modeled as an i.i.d. random Gaussian
vector with zero mean and identity covariance matrix and it
is denoted as zi. The relation between input and output of the
channel is defined as
yi = hiiXi +
∑
j 6=i
hjiXj + zi ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,K} (1)
Our assumption is that the channel gains are real valued and
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Fig. 1: The K-user Gaussian interference channel model with
confidential messages.
known by the transmitters. Fig. 1 illustrates the communi-
cation model. We assume that the transmitted and received
codewords, i.e., Xj and yi are of length N , for all i, j ∈
{1, . . . ,K}. Transmitter j has an independent confidential
message for receiver j which is denoted as Wj and is uni-
formly distributed over the set {1, 2, . . . , 2NRj}. Transmitter
j encodes its message to codeword Xj through a stochastic
encoder Ej subject to a power constraint ‖Xj‖22 ≤ NP , where
P is a positive number. Also, receiver i is equipped with
decoder Di which maps codeword yi to an estimate of its
message: Wˆi = Di(yi).
Definition 1 (Achievable secure rates): For theK-user (K >
2) Gaussian interference channel with independent confidential
messages, a non-negative secure-rate tuple (R1, R2, . . . , RK)
is achievable with weak secrecy, if for any ǫ > 0 and suffi-
ciently large N , there exist encoders {Ej}Kj=1 and decoders
{Di}Ki=1 such that ∀i, j{1, 2, . . . ,K}:
Prob (Di(yi) 6=Wi) < ǫ, (2)
Rj ≤ 1
N
H(Wj |y1, . . . ,yj−1,yj+1, . . . ,yK) + ǫ (3)
III. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we present the achievable secure rates the
defined interference channel model.
We define a few notations to present the secure rates in
closed form. Assume Rℓcomb is an achievable rate at which
confidential message Wℓ can be reliably decoded at Receiver
ℓ without any security constraint. Also, assume Pℓ,m ≥ 0
is the power allocated by Transmitter ℓ to encode the m-th
component of confidential message Wℓ where total number
of components is set to a positive integer M . Assume m∗ is
the index of the component with the densest lattice codebook.
Additionally, the power allocated by Transmitter ℓ to encode
the m-th component of the jamming codeword is denoted by
P Jℓ,m. Also, assume S ⊂ {1, 2, . . . ,M} where |S|M → 1 for
large enough M . Then, we have
Theorem 1 (Achievable secure rates): A non-negative rate
tuple (R1, R2, . . . , RK) which satisfies the following inequal-
ities is achievable with weak secrecy for the defined interfer-
ence channel model:
Rℓ < R
ℓ
comb−
max
i
i6=ℓ

log


M∑
m∈S
|S|
M
→1
h2ℓ,iPℓ,m + h
2
K−ℓ+1,iP
J
K−ℓ+1,m
h2K−ℓ+1,iP
J
K−ℓ+1,m∗



 (4)
Note that the supremum of all such rates over power allo-
cations Pℓ,m and P
J
ℓ,m, for all (ℓ,m), are also achievable so
long as the power allocations satisfy the power constraints in
Section IV are satisfied.
The codebook structure and the encoding-decoding algorithms
are described in Section IV. Our achievable scheme utilizes
nested lattice codebooks and random i.i.d. repetitions to gen-
erate two-layered lattice codewords. Transmitters apply beam-
forming operation on message codewords as well as jamming
codewords to ensure the security of the confidential messages
at any unintended receiver. Note that despite the cooperative
jamming scheme, no online communication among the trans-
mitters is required. Proof of reliable decoding and analysis of
weak secrecy are presented in the following section.
Corollary 1: The optimal sum secure degrees of freedom
(s.s.d.f.) of 1 for an interference channel with arbitrary K > 2
users is achievable following our scheme for weak and mod-
erately weak interference power is 1, i.e.,
s.s.d.f =
∑K
ℓ=1Rℓ
1
2 log(1 + P )
≤ 1 (5)
Proof of Corollary 1 is presented in Subsection IV-E.
IV. ACHIEVABILITY SCHEME
We prove the achievablity result presented in Theorem
1 by describing the codebook construction followed by the
encoding and decoding operations as well as analysis of
secrecy.
A. Codebook construction
Our codebook and encoding process is based on the idea
of passive cooperation among the transmitters. The passive
cooperation happens when each transmitter is a sender of
its own message but also acts as a helper to protect the
confidentiality of another user’s message at the illegitimate
receivers. For instance, in the K-user setting, transmitter 1
helps protecting Transmitter K’s message at all the receivers
except receiverK , and transmitter 2 does the same job for user
K−1 and so forth. The reason we call this cooperation passive
is that it does not require users to exchange messages among
each other so long as they know the channel state and the
index of the user they need to help which can be agreed on in
the initial acquisition and prior to online secure transmission.
Broadly speaking, Transmitter i protect its confidential mes-
sage with the help of Transmitter j = K−i+1which generates
a random jamming codeword which is beam-formed to align
with the i-th message codeword at every receiver except
receiver i, simultaneously. Since the same pair of codewords
needs to simultaneously get aligned at multiple receivers with
different channel gains, perfect alignment between the two
codewords is not possible. However, partial alignment across
multiple dimensions can occur. It can be shown that if the
messages are encoded across large number of dimensions inde-
pendently, partial alignment can asymptotically approach per-
fect alignment [13]. Therefore, in our codebook construction,
we split the confidential messages and jamming signals into
large number of independent components. Each component is
encoded separately and the superposition of all components are
transmitted over the channel. The codebooks used for encoding
confidential messages and the jamming signals form a nested
lattice structure in which the jamming codwords are drawn
from a finer lattice codebook compared to message codeword.
The reason is that the jamming signal needs to get aligned with
any possible realization of the confidential message codeword
at unintended receivers. A pair of a coarse and a fine lattice
sets are used to encode each individual confidential message
and jamming signal. Assume that the pair used to encode the
m-th component of the confidential message j at transmitter j
is denoted as (Λmj ,Λ
m
f,j). Also, the associated lattice pair used
for protecting the m-th component of confidential message
K − j + 1 is denoted as (ΛmJ,j,ΛmfJ,j). For each component
m the following nested lattice relation holds amongst all the
lattice sets:
Λ ⊆ ΛmK ⊆ ΛmK−1 ⊆ . . .Λm1 ⊆ ΛmJ,K ⊆ . . .ΛmJ,1 ⊆ Λmf,K
⊆ . . .Λmf,1 ⊆ ΛmJf,K ⊆ . . .ΛmJf,1 (6)
The coarse lattice sets are scaled such that their second mo-
ments are equal to σ2m,K , . . . , σ
2
m,1, σ
2
Jm,K , . . . , σ
2
Jm,1. Also,
the fundamental Voronoi region of these coarse lattice sets
are denoted as Vmi for the coarse lattice associated with the
m-th component of message i and VmJ,i for the coarse lattice
associated with the m-th component of the jamming signal
generated at transmitter i. The center of a corset of the fine
lattice Λmf,i is an n-length random vector (lattice word) and
is denoted by tm,i. The inner codebook used for encoding
the m-th component of message i is defined as the union of
all realizations of this vector, i.e., Lm,i , {tm,i|tm,i ∈ Vmi }.
Similary, the inner codebook for the jamming signal is defined
as LJm,i , {um,i|um,i ∈ VmJ,i}, where um,i is also an n-
length lattice word associated with the center of a corset of
fine lattice ΛmJf,i.
We use an i.i.d. random repetition of the inner codeword to
construct an outer codeword. This step is done to take advan-
tage of Packing Lemma [14] in the proof of secrecy. Consider a
probability distribution P (tm,i) over the elements of codebook
Lm,i. Transmitter i draws B independent realizations of the
inner codeword tm,i according to distribution P (tm,i). These
n-length lattice words are concatenated to form an N , n×B
length vector which is a realization of the outer codeword t¯m,i.
To construct the corresponding outer codebook, Transmitter i
generates 2NR
i
comb,m realizations of the outer codeword t¯m,i.
This outer codebook is denoted as Cm,i. Similary, the outer
codebook generated to encode the m-th component of the
jamming signal at Transmitter i is denoted as CJm,i and its
outer codeword element is denoted as u¯m,i.
The constructed outer codebooks are partitioned to emulate the
wiretap code [2]. To do this, Transmitter i randomly partitions
codebook Cm,i into 2NRm,i bins of equal sizes. Each bin
(m, i) is given an index wm,i where wm,i ∈ {1, . . . , 2NRm,i}.
These indices are essentially independent submessages of the
confidential message Wi. The transmitter chooses the non-
negative rates Rm,i such that Ri =
∑M
m=1Rm,i, where the
secure rate Ri is set to
Ri , R
i
comb−
max
ℓ
ℓ 6=i

log


M∑
m∈S
|S|
M
→1
h2iℓPi,m + h
2
K−i+1,ℓP
J
K−i+1,m
h2K−i+1,ℓP
J
K−i+1,m∗



 (7)
where for all m,m∗ ∈ M , and i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K}, quantities
Pi,m and P
J
i,m are positive values that represent power allo-
cation among confidential message and jamming signal com-
ponents, respectively. These quantities are formally defined in
Subsection IV-B.
Additionally, for each component of the confidential message
i and the jamming signal, transmitter i generates a random
dither codeword d¯m,i and d¯Jm,i, respectively. Dithers are
drawn uniformly random from the corresponding Voronoi
regions, Vm,i and VJm,i. Dithers are public information and
after selection are provided to all parties. In the following we
establish the details of the codebook construction at Transmit-
ter 1 which protects Transmitter K’s confidential message at
receivers 1, 2, . . . ,K−1. Codebook construction is performed
at the other transmitters in a similar fashion.
B. Encoding
Transmitter i splits the confidential message wi ∈
{1, . . .2NRi} into M , T 2K−2 independent sub-messages,
where T is a large number. The m-th sub-message is denoted
as wm,i ∈ {1, . . . , 2NRm,i}. To encode this sub-message,
Transmitter i randomly picks an outer codeword t¯m,i from
the corresponding outer codebook Cm,i. Next, the selected
codeword is mixed with a random dither d¯m,i according to
the following equation
x˜m,i , [t¯m,i + d¯m,i] mod Λ
m
i (8)
The modular operation in dithering step is done blockwise
over each n-length block, separately. Similarly, the jamming
codeword x˜Jm,i is defined. Note that the lattice set associated
with the jamming codwords are denser than the message code-
words. In the next step, beam-forming operation is performed
over each sub-message codeword. Note that each component
is sent over a different beam-forming dimension where the
number of all the dimensions is M . The idea is to align the
jamming signal and the confidential message codeword across
many such dimensions at unintended receivers. The precoder
applied to codeword x˜m,i is denoted as f(m, i,K− i+1,H),
where H = (h1,h2, . . . ,hK) is the matrix of channel gains
from all transmitters to all receivers. The precoder f is a
mapping that takes sub-message indices (m, i) and channel
gains H as inputs and outputs a scalar value. This mapping
ensures that the resulting codewords are rationally independent
for all channel gains expect for a small Lebesgue measure.
Transmitter i applies the individual precoders over each com-
ponent codeword and transmits the superposition codeword xi
over the channel, where
xi ,
M∑
m=1
x˜m,if(m, i,K − i+ 1,H) (9)
Similarly, a precoder is applied to the jamming codeword to
protect the confidential message of user K − i+ 1, i.e.,
xJi ,
M∑
m=1
x˜Jm,ig(m, i,K − i+ 1,H) (10)
The transmitted codeword is denoted as Xi , xi + x
J
i
and it satisfies the power constraint. Let us define Pm,i ,
σ2m,i|f(m, i,K− i+1,H)|2 and Pi =
∑M
m=1 Pm,i. Similarly,
for the jamming codeword, define P Jm,i , σ
2
Jm,i|f(m, i,K −
i + 1,H)|2 and P Ji =
∑M
m=1 P
J
m,i. Transmitter i allocates
power between jamming power and message power such
that Pi + P
J
i ≤ P . Furthermore, the coarse lattice sets
associated with every jamming codeword is scaled such that
for ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, we have
h2K−i+1,iP
J
K−i+1 ≤ 1 (11)
Note that the above condition is essential to achieve sum
secure degrees of freedom of 1 and without this condition, the
achievable sum secure degrees of freedom would reach K
K+1 .
The precoder mapping f(m, i,K − i + 1,H) is a product
of powers of channel gains between both Transmitter i and
Transmitter K − i + 1 and the receivers, i.e.,
f(m, i,K − i+ 1,H) = (hr1i1hr2i2 . . . hri−1i,i−1hrii,i+1 . . . hrK−1iK )×
(hrKK−i+1,1h
rK+1
K−i+1,2 . . . h
rK+i−1
K−i+1,i−1h
rK+i
K−i+1,i+1 . . . h
r2K−2
K−i+1,K)
(12)
and
g(m, i,K − i+ 1,H) = (hr1i1 . . . hrK−ii,K−ihrK−i+1i,K−i+2 . . . hrK−1iK )×
(hrKK−i+1,1h
rK+1
K−i+1,2 . . . h
rK−i
K−i+1,K−ih
rK−i+1
K−i+1,K−i+2 . . . h
r2K−2
K−i+1,K)
(13)
The powers (r1, r2, . . . , r2K−2) are computed using a one-
to-one mapping φ(m) that takes the m-th beam-forming
dimension to the 2K−2-length tuple power where each power
is one of the possible T dimensions. In other words, we have:
φ(m) : {1, . . . ,M} → {1, . . . , T }×{1, . . . , T }×. . .{1, . . . , T }
(14)
and for every m ∈ {1, . . . ,M} there exists a non-negative
2K − 2 length tuple such that
(r1, r2, . . . , r2K−2) = φ(m) rj ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T } (15)
C. Decoding
Decoding at each receiver follows asymmetric compute-and-
forward technique used in [12]. In the following, we describe
the decoding process at Receiver i. Other receivers act in a
similar manner.
Receiver i observes the scaled lattice codeword associated with
its own message plus a set of unintended codewords aligned
with jamming codewords plus effective noise as
yi = hiixi +
K∑
ℓ=1
ℓ 6=i
(hℓixℓ + hK−ℓ+1,ix
J
K−ℓ+1)
+ hK−i+1,ix
J
K−i+1 + zi (16)
Due to asymptotic alignment [13] along many beam-forming
dimensions, the collections of the confidential and the jam-
ming codewords participating in the second term in (16) are
mutually aligned. Also, note that due to the constraint in (11),
the power of the third term falls below noise power (assuming
all noise powers are normalized). Also, this term includes only
a jamming signal which is of no use to Receiver i. Note that
the condition in (11) is aligned with weakly and moderately
weak interference definition in [8]. Therefore, Receiver i treats
the third term as an additional noise term and the normalized
effective noise term z˜i is defined as
z˜i ,
1√
1 + h2K−i+1,iP
J
K−i+1
(hK−i+1,ix
J
K−i+1 + zi) (17)
As a result, Receiver i effectively observes a K-user Multiple
Access Channel (MAC) at its end, i.e.,
y˜i ,
hii√
1 + h2K−i+1,iP
J
K−i+1
xi
+
1√
1 + h2K−i+1,iP
J
K−i+1
K∑
ℓ=1
ℓ 6=i
(hℓixℓ+hK−ℓ+1,ix
J
K−ℓ+1)+z˜i
(18)
The effective MAC channel gain vector at Receiver
i is denoted as heff,i and it is defined as
heff,i ,
(
hii√
1+h2
K−i+1,iP
J
K−i+1
, 1√
1+h2
K−i+1,iP
J
K−i+1
, . . . ,
1√
1+h2
K−i+1,iP
J
K−i+1
)T
.
The ratio between the power of each effective codeword
in the effective MAC equation (18) and the power
constraint P is defined as power scaling vector beff,i and
beff,i ,
(√
Pi
P
,
√
h2
1i
P1+h2KiP
J
K
P
, . . . ,
√
h2
Ki
PK+h21iP
J
1
P
)T
Now, Receiver i applies the compute-and-forward technique
used for a MAC channel in [10]. Receiver i finds the nearly
optimal set of linear independent integer-valued coefficient
vectors which maximize the achievable MAC sum-rate for
that Receiver. The receiver constructs K-linearly independent
equations using these integer-valued coefficient vectors and
decode each equation successively. The first equation is to
aim to decode the effective lattice codeword with the highest
data rate, i.e., the lattice codeword that belongs to the densest
fine lattice set. Upon decoding the codeword, it is canceled
out from the second equation and so forth. Therefore, the
least achievable equation rate is associated with the K-th
combination equation.
Let us denote the optimal set of integer-valued coefficient
vectors that construct the K combination equations
with a1, a2, . . . , aK . Also, let us denote the rates
at which the combination equations are decoded at
Receiver i as Ricomb,1, R
i
comb,2, . . . , R
i
comb,K . The set
of coefficient vectors is computed such that the rate at which
combination equations are decoded is non-increasing, i.e.,
Ricomb,1 ≥ Ricomb,2 ≥ · · · ≥ Ricomb,K . Basically, the effective
codeword with the highest achievable rate is decoded first
and canceled out and then the second highest rate effective
codeword is decoded and so forth. Let us denote the first
combination equation as v1 , a1(ℓ)xeff,ℓ. For instance, the
effective codewords at Receiver i are defined as xeff,1 , xi,
xeff,2 , h1ix1 + hKix
J
K and so forth so it would match
the corresponding gain order in the effective MAC observed
by Receive i. Decoding equation v1 is performed using the
compute-and-forward technique [10], [15] by scaling the
noisy observation and canceling out the public dithers as
β1y˜i −
K∑
ℓ=1
a1(ℓ)d¯eff,ℓ = v1 + zeff,1 (19)
where
zeff,1 ,
K∑
ℓ=1
(β1heff (ℓ)− a1(ℓ))xeff,ℓ + β1z˜i (20)
Let us denote the second moment of the effective noise term
associated with combination equation 1 in (20) as σ2eff,1.
Following Theorem 2 in [15] equation v1 can be decoded
at an achievable rate Ricomb,1 =
1
2 log(
Peff,j
σ2
eff,1
), where j is the
index of the effective lattice codeword with densest lattice sets
among participating codewords in combination equation v1.
Similarly, combination equations v2, . . . ,vK are constructed
and decoded. Assume that the mapping between effective
codeword indices and the order at which they get decoded
at Receiver i is determined by a one-to-one permutation
function πi(.) : {1, 2, . . . ,K} → {1, 2, . . . ,K}. Therefore,
the achievable combination rates are derived as
Ricomb,ℓ =
1
2
log
(
Peff,πi(ℓ)
σ2eff,ℓ
)
(21)
We already established that the combination equations are
constructed such that the codeword with the densest lattice
set gets decoded first therefore σ2eff,1 ≤ σ2eff,2 ≤ . . . σ2eff,K .
As a result, the lowest achievable rate to decode effective
codeword xeff,1 at Receiver i, i.e., xi is
Ricomb ,
1
2
log
(
Peff,1
σ2eff,i,K
)
=
1
2
log
(
Pi
σ2eff,i,K
)
(22)
Similarly, the achievable combination rates are determined at
the other receivers. Since Ri ≤ Ricomb for i ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, the
achievability proof is completed. In the following subsection,
we show that Ri is achievable with weak secrecy.
D. Analysis of Security
So far we have shown that the lower bound stated in
Theorem 1 are achievable in terms of reliably getting decoded
at intended receivers. In this part, we proceed with showing
the presented rates provide weak secrecy for every confidential
message at all unintended receivers. To do this, it suffice to
show the following for an arbitrary Receiver i ∈ {1, . . . ,K}:
1
N
I(W1, . . . ,Wi−1,Wi+1, . . . ,WK ;yi) ≤ ǫ (23)
in which ǫ > 0 approaches to zero as N = nB tends to
infinity. Note that 1
N
I(W1, . . . ,Wi−1,Wi+1, . . . ,WK ;yi) =∑K
ℓ=1
ℓ 6=i
Rℓ − 1nBH(W1, . . . ,Wi−1,Wi+1, . . . ,WK |yi) and
since conditioning does not increase entropy, we have
1
N
I(W1, . . . ,Wi−1,Wi+1, . . . ,WK ;yi) ≤
K∑
ℓ=1
ℓ 6=i
Rℓ − 1
nB
H(W1, . . . ,Wi−1,Wi+1, . . . ,WK |yi, t¯i) (24)
Next step is to obtain a lower bound on the second term in
(24). Let us define notation {t¯}Kℓ=1
ℓ 6=i
which represents the set of
outer lattice codewords of all transmitters expect Transmitter
i. We have
1
nB
H(W1, . . . ,Wi−1,Wi+1, . . . ,WK |yi, t¯i)
=
1
nB
H(W1, . . . ,Wi−1,Wi+1, . . . ,WK , {t¯}Kℓ=1
ℓ 6=i
, |yi, t¯i)
− 1
nB
H({t¯}Kℓ=1
ℓ 6=i
|yi, t¯i,W1, . . . ,Wi−1,Wi+1, . . . ,WK)
≥ 1
nB
H({t¯}Kℓ=1
ℓ 6=i
|yi, t¯i)
− 1
nB
H({t¯}Kℓ=1
ℓ 6=i
|yi, t¯i,W1, . . . ,Wi−1,Wi+1, . . . ,WK)
(a)
≥ 1
nB
H({t¯}Kℓ=1
ℓ 6=i
|yi, t¯i)− 2ǫi
(b)
≥ 1
nB
H({t¯}Kℓ=1
ℓ 6=i
|yi, t¯i, {d¯}Kℓ=1,xJK−i+1, zi)− 2ǫi
=
1
nB
H({t¯}Kℓ=1
ℓ 6=i
|
K∑
ℓ=1
ℓ 6=i
(hℓixℓ + hK−ℓ+1,ix
J
K−ℓ+1), t¯i,
{d¯}Kℓ=1,xJK−i+1, zi)− 2ǫi
=
1
nB
H({t¯}Kℓ=1
ℓ 6=i
|
K∑
ℓ=1
ℓ 6=i
(hℓixℓ + hK−ℓ+1,ix
J
K−ℓ+1), t¯i,
{d¯}Kℓ=1,xJK−i+1, zi)− 2ǫi
=
1
nB
H({t¯}Kℓ=1
ℓ 6=i
|
K∑
ℓ=1
ℓ 6=i
[ M∑
m=1
hℓixℓ,m + hK−ℓ+1,ix
J
K−ℓ+1,m)
]
mod ΛJm∗,ℓ,
K∑
ℓ=1
ℓ 6=i
QΛJ
m∗,ℓ
( M∑
m=1
hℓixℓ,m+hK−ℓ+1,ix
J
K−ℓ+1,m)
)
,
t¯i, {d¯}Kℓ=1,xJK−i+1, zi)− 2ǫi
(c)
≥ 1
nB
H
(
{t¯}Kℓ=1
ℓ 6=i
∣∣∣∣
K∑
ℓ=1
ℓ 6=i
[ M∑
m∈S
|S|
M
→1
(
hℓixℓ,m + hK−ℓ+1,ix
J
K−ℓ+1,m)
) ]
mod ΛJm∗,ℓ,
t¯i, {d¯}Kℓ=1,xJK−i+1, zi
)
−
1
nB
K∑
ℓ=1
ℓ 6=i
H
(
QΛJ
m∗
ℓ
( M∑
m∈S
|S|
M
→1
(
hℓixℓ,m + hK−ℓ+1,ix
J
K−ℓ+1,m
))
− 2ǫi
(d)
=
1
nB
H
(
{t¯}Kℓ=1
ℓ 6=i
|
K∑
ℓ=1
ℓ 6=i
[ M∑
m∈S
|S|
M
→1
hℓif(m, ℓ,K − ℓ+1,H)t¯ℓ,m
+hK−ℓ+1,ig(m,K−ℓ+1,K−ℓ,H)u¯JK−ℓ+1,m
]
mod ΛJm∗,ℓ,
t¯i, {d¯}Kℓ=1,xJK−i+1, zi
)
−
1
nB
K∑
ℓ=1
ℓ 6=i
H
(
QΛJ
m∗
ℓ
( M∑
m∈S
|S|
M
→1
(
hℓixℓ,m + hK−ℓ+1,ix
J
K−ℓ+1,m
))
− 2ǫi
e
=
1
nB
H
(
{t¯}Kℓ=1
ℓ 6=i
|
K∑
ℓ=1
ℓ 6=i
[ M∑
m∈S
|S|
M
→1
hℓif(m, ℓ,K − ℓ+ 1,H)t¯ℓ,m
+hK−ℓ+1,ig(m,K−ℓ+1,K−ℓ,H)u¯JK−ℓ+1,m
]
mod ΛJm∗,ℓ
)
− 1
nB
K∑
ℓ=1
ℓ 6=i
H
(
QΛJ
m∗
ℓ
( M∑
m∈S
|S|
M
→1
(
hℓixℓ,m + hK−ℓ+1,ix
J
K−ℓ+1,m
))
− 2ǫi
f
=
1
nB
H({t¯}Kℓ=1
ℓ 6=i
)−
1
nB
K∑
ℓ=1
ℓ 6=i
H
(
QΛJ
m∗
ℓ
( M∑
m∈S
|S|
M
→1
(
hℓixℓ,m + hK−ℓ+1,ix
J
K−ℓ+1,m
))
− 2ǫi
g
=
1
nB
H({t¯}Kℓ=1
ℓ 6=i
)
−
K∑
ℓ=1
ℓ 6=i
log


M∑
m∈S
|S|
M
→1
h2ℓiPℓ,m + h
2
K−ℓ+1,iP
J
K−ℓ+1,m
h2K−ℓ+1,iP
J
K−ℓ+1,m∗


− 2ǫi − δ
h
=
K∑
ℓ=1
ℓ 6=i
Rℓcomb−
K∑
ℓ=1
ℓ 6=i
log


M∑
m∈S
|S|
M
→1
h2ℓiPℓ,m + h
2
K−ℓ+1,iP
J
K−ℓ+1,m
h2K−ℓ+1,iP
J
K−ℓ+1,m∗


− 2ǫi − δ
(25)
In the above inequalities the followings hold: inequality (a) is
due to i.i.d. random repetitions of the outer codewords and is
deduced by using Packing Lemma as shown in [14]. Inequality
(b) holds since conditioning does not increase entropy. Also,
we defined the set of all public dither codewords from all
users with notation {d¯}Kℓ=1. Inequality (c) is concluded from
the principal that joint entropy is not bigger than the sum
of individual entropies. Equality (d) comes from definition
of codewords described in Subsection IV-A. Equality (e)
holds after subtracting off the dithers from outer codewords.
Inequality (f) comes applying Crypto Lemma [16] to the first
term. Note that the jamming codewords are constructed from
denser lattice sets and have uniform distribution over their
codebooks, therefore the aligned codeword belongs to the
same codebook and it is also uniformly distributed hence
it is independent of the confidential message codewords.
Inequality (g) is concluded from Lemma 1 in [17] and power
allocation among message and jamming codewords described
in Subsection IV-B. Lastly, equality h comes from the rate of
constructed outer lattice codewords explained in Subsection
IV-A.
E. Proof of Corollary 1
We present the proof in two steps. Step 1 is to prove that the
first term in expression (4) achieves 1
K
degrees of freedom for
each user. Step 2 is to show that the second term in expression
(4) is constant with respect to power constraint P as power P
approaches infinity.
Step 1: Following Corollary 5 in [10], all K optimal combina-
tion rates in (4) offer 1
K
degrees of freedom for almost every
real-valued channel gain vector.
Step 2: This step is to show that for each user the second
term in expression (4) is constant with respect to power P as
P tends to large values, i.e., the following holds:
lim
P→∞
[
log


M∑
m∈S
|S|
M
→1
h2ℓiPℓ,m + h
2
K−ℓ+1,iP
J
K−ℓ+1,m
h2K−ℓ+1,iP
J
K−ℓ+1,m∗

×
1
log(1 + P )
]
→ 0
(26)
Note that partial powers Pℓ,m and P
J
ℓ,m are allocated power
to encode the m-th component of the confidential message ℓ
and the jamming signal at Transmitter ℓ, respectively. These
powers are tuned to satisfy the power constraint P . Therefore,
at each Transmitter ℓ and for all m ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M} we have
Pℓ,m = αℓ,mP and P
J
ℓ,m = βℓ,mP for some positive factors
0 < αℓ,m < 1 and 0 < βℓ,m < 1. Therefore, we have
h2ℓiPℓ,m + h
2
K−ℓ+1,iP
J
K−ℓ+1,m
h2K−ℓ+1,iP
J
K−ℓ+1,m∗
=
P
(
h2ℓiαℓ,m + h
2
K−ℓ+1,iβK−ℓ+1,m
)
P
(
h2K−ℓ+1,iβK−ℓ+1,m∗
)
=
h2ℓiαℓ,m + h
2
K−ℓ+1,iβK−ℓ+1,m
h2K−ℓ+1,iβK−ℓ+1,m∗
(27)
where all the terms in expression (27) are considered constant
with respect to power P and hence, the following is deduced
lim
P→∞
[
log
(
h2ℓiαℓ,m + h
2
K−ℓ+1,iβK−ℓ+1,m
h2K−ℓ+1,iβK−ℓ+1,m∗
)
×
1
log(1 + P )
→ 0
]
(28)
Also, note that in [4] it was shown that sum secure degrees
of freedom of 1 is the upper bound for an arbitrary K-user
interference channel with confidential messages. Therefore,
our achievable sum secure degrees of freedom is optimal. This
concludes the proof of Corollary 1.
V. CONCLUSION
We provided a new achievable security scheme to transmit
confidential messages over an asymmetric interference channel
with arbitrary number of users (K > 2) so long as interference
is within weak and moderately weak interference regimes. Our
achievable scheme utilizes the nested lattice codebooks, i.i.d.
repetitive codes, cooperative jamming, superposition coding,
and the compute-and-forward decoding strategy.
We showed that following our scheme, users achieve secure
rates which scale linearly with log(SNR) and a sum secure rate
that is within constant gap of sum capacity. Our cooperative
scheme shared among transmitters achieves the sum secure
degrees of freedom of 1 without any online communication
among transmitters or using external helpers.
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